Moral Psychology of the Fading Affect Bias
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-2018
Abstract
We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attributed to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the “fading affect bias,” namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emotions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. Secondarily, we note that if Julia Driver’s moral theory is correct, then the disposition to display the fading affect bias is a moral virtue.
Publication
Philosophical Psychology
Publisher
Routledge - Taylor & Francis
Volume
31
Issue
7
Pages
1097-1113
Department
College of Arts and Sciences
Recommended Citation
Corsa, A. J., & Walker, W. R. (2018). Moral psychology of the fading affect bias. Philosophical Psychology, 31(7), 1097-1113. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1477126
Comments
Received 03 Jul 2017, Accepted 12 Feb 2018, Published online: 02 Jul 2018