Response to: “Laws of Nature and Hume’s Problem of Induction” by Alexander Bozzo
Document Type
Response or Comment
Publication Date
Fall 11-16-2012
Abstract
“Laws of Nature and Hume’s Problem of Induction,” Alexander Bozzo, Marquette University
David Hume places pressure on the justification of inductive arguments with the so-called problem of induction. Relevant to this discussion is Hume’s denial of any knowledge of a necessary connection implicit in causation. Hume suggests that the subjective probability of billiard ball a’s striking b in circumstances c in manner k is highly improbable. But we can ask: What’s the probability of consecutively witnessing billiard balls moving in manner k given the same initial circumstances c? Indeed, given the probability calculus, the probability of such uniform occurrences is extremely improbable. In this paper, I argue that the best explanation of this data is that laws of nature exist, guaranteeing the realization of such large improbabilities; and that, once admitted, the problem of induction no longer constitutes a serious threat.
Host
University of Indianapolis
Conference/Symposium
Indiana Philosophical Association Fall 2012 Meeting
City/State
Indianapolis, IN
Department
College of Arts and Sciences
Recommended Citation
Hamm, R. F., III. (2012, November 16). Response to: “Laws of Nature and Hume’s Problem of Induction” by Alexander Bozzo [Response to Paper presentation]. Indiana Philosophical Association Fall 2012 Meeting, Indianapolis, IN, United States.
Comments
Eric Hamm delivered the response to: “Laws of Nature and Hume’s Problem of Induction” by Alexander Bozzo (Marquette University) at the Indiana Philosophical Association Fall 2012 Meeting at the University of Indianapolis.